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Summary 
The globalization of trade in high quality foods is stimulating the development of 
international food standards and certification systems. Third-party certification as evolved 
as a means of ensuring that product information and signals on quality and safety attributes 
are sound and reliable. Certification can only provide credible market signals if it operates 
objectively and independently. This paper investigates the potential trade-off between 
certifiers’ objectivity and the level of competition in the rapidly expanding market for third-
party certification of quality foods. Based on a theoretical supply chain framework a nested 
panel analysis is applied to a set of accredited certifiers for the EurepGAP fruits and 
vegetables standard. Our results indicate that increasing economies of scale and market 
share in certification do matter.  
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1. Introduction 
Markets for high-quality foods have changed dramatically in recent decades and especially 
in the advent of the new millennium, creating an increasingly complex global food system.  
A multiplication of food-safety outbreaks diminished consumers’ confidence and trust in 
the ability of the agro-food industry and governmental authorities to assure the provision of 
safe and high quality foods.  Increasing vertical coordination in food supply chains has 
triggered a shift in structures from single firm to multi-stakeholder supply-chain 
configurations (Barkema and Drabenstott 1995).  A particularly critical issue of this new 
paradigm of food supply is the emergence of opportunistic behaviour associated with 
information asymmetries between contracting parties.   
Credible quality signalling evolves as a pivotal element facilitating transactions among 
agents in the food chain.  Reliable product information becomes even more important when 
firms’ differentiating strategy involves credence attributes such as food safety, organic 
farming or fair trade.  Shifts in governmental consumer protection strategies and stricter 
private food quality and safety standards impose greater responsibility on food operators, 
especially retailers, which are being forced to assume a “gatekeeper’s” role as guarantors of 
food quality and safety.  This is certainly the case in the UK, where the Food Safety Act of 
1990 requires a stricter control of production and processing along the supply chain and 
forces retailers to assume their share of responsibility on the provision of food safety 
(Henson and Northen 1998).  Across Europe retailers are adapting to the new market 
agenda developing imposing quality assurance systems on supplier’s to assure the safety 
and quality of their products and to mitigate product liability (Hatanaka, Bain and Busch 
2005) 
In the European Union private and public authorities have defined and specified a number 
of new quality assurance and labelling systems relying on control and certification schemes 
provided by independent and impartial agents.  These control systems reassure partners in   652
the food chain and consumers’ of the quality and safety of products.  In recent years several 
new control and certification bodies have been created and compete to offer its services to 
firms seeking certification from good farming practices to processor specifications in 
various standards.  Thus, new markets emerged where firms compete to provide food 
quality and safety certification services for different private or public food standards. 
This paper focuses on the recently created certification services market.  The main goal is 
to analyse how the structure of the international market for third-party certification of high 
quality foods influences the objectiveness of third-party certifiers and thus the credibility of 
the certification process. 
Third-party certifiers (TPC) have evolved as independent and credible institutions designed 
to ensure quality and safety standards across food markets.  Third-party certification is one 
way to assess and to monitor firm’s compliance with standards, practices, principles, and/or 
legal requirements, where ‘certification’ is the voluntary assessment of and approval by an 
accredited party and an accredited standard (Meuwissen et al. 2003).  Product and/or 
process certification may reduce uncertainties and lower overall transaction costs that arise 
from information asymmetries between producers and retailers in vertical supply chains 
[Caswell et al, 1998; Tanner 2000; Deaton 2004; Manning and Baines 2004].   
As the demand for private third-party certification of quality assurance schemes increases 
so does the level of competition among accredited certifiers as additional TPCs enter the 
market.  Busch et al. (2005) and Tanner (2000) point out that the credibility of third-party 
certification critically depends on the objectiveness and independence of the certifier.  As 
the competitive structure in the TPC market is shifting there may be a trade-off between the 
objectiveness of third-party certifiers and market structure as shown by Lizzeri (1999).  If 
this is the case, the role of third-party certifiers as an efficient and signalling institution has 
to be questioned [Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone 2003; McCluskey 2000].  
The paper is organized as follows:  Section two provides an overview of the economics of 
third-party certification with an emphasis on recent work and its implications on food 
markets.  Section three proposes an analytical framework relating the structure of the TPC 
market to the objectivity of the certification process.  The fourth section presents an 
empirical case study using panel data on the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group 
(EUREP) Good agricultural practices (GAP) quality assurance system in the international 
fruits and vegetables market.  Finally conclusions are drawn. 
2.  The Emergence of Third-Party Certifiers and Their 
Role in Food Chains 
According to the traditional neo-classical economic model both suppliers and buyers in the 
market are fully informed about the homogenous commodity that is exchanged.  In fact, 
today’s global food system is rather characterised by highly diversified products and far 
reaching information deficits on both side of the market (Jahn, Schramm and Spiller 2005).  
Empirical studies on food markets suggest that third-party certifiers may in fact facilitate 
the mitigation of market failure due to information asymmetries between market 
participants.  Caswell et al. (1998) argue that third-party certification may reduce 
transactions costs where uncertainty about product attributes exists.  Henson and Reardon 
(2005) and Fulponi (2006) analyse the impact and use of third-party certifiers to mitigate 
uncertainty and reduce information asymmetry between producers and retailers in vertical 
food-supply chains.  Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone (2003) investigate the relation 
between the stringency of third-party certifiers and optimal quality systems in terms of 
agricultural output.  Only if these organisations are successful in establishing a positive 
reputation will their certificates be accepted as credible signals in the market place. 
The above studies emphasise the benefits of independent signalling and certification 
institutions.  However, none of them considers the fact that nowadays most certification 
systems are privately organized.  While public certification authorities enforce standards   653
through laws and fines, private certification institutions constitute economic agents that 
typically follow some form of economic profit-maximisation rule.  Therefore, as Jahn, 
Schramm and Spiller (2005) state the analysis of third-party certification systems has to 
acknowledge the existence of opportunistic behaviour rather then assuming that private 
certifiers will always be capable of carrying out certification in the most efficient and 
effective manner.   
In his seminal paper Tirole (1986) analyses the relationship between three agents (principal, 
agent and supervisor) in an organization viewed as a network of intertwined contracts.  
Tirole (1986) offers important insight into the importance of independence of the third 
party in transaction processes.  He shows that with a dependent third party, coalitions may 
emerge between market partners (supervisors and principals or supervisors and agents).  If 
coalitions emerge, the process of revealing information is hindered.   
Using a game theory approach Lizzeri (1999) looks at the impact of the certification’s 
market structure on gathering and revealing information.  He shows that if the third-party 
certifier is a monopolist, it will reveal only part of the information gathered which creates a 
monopoly rent and decreases social welfare.  Contrarily, under a perfectly competitive 
third-party certification market, all private information is revealed and social welfare is 
optimal.  Therefore, market structure needs to be considered when analysing the market 
mechanism for third-party certification.   
  Tanner (2000) provides an insiders view to the nature of a third-party certifiers.  
He notes that TPCs need to be experienced organizations and demonstrate expertise in 
certification procedures.  While Tanner claims that a critical point to the role of TPCs is 
their true independence, he also suggests that “the third-party’s relationship with the first-
party, the client food company, is also more supportive and “arm around the shoulder” than 
the relationship between the company and the regulator” (p. 415).  Tanner reveals an 
ambiguity in the role of TPCs.  Being supportive to the certified firm may imply a 
relaxation of the certification process and expose a conflict of interests between the TPC’s 
independence and the need to act cooperatively with the certified firm.  Baumman (2001) 
and Giannakas (2002) provide empirical evidence of opportunistic behaviour in the organic 
control schemes, estimating that frauds in organic labelling were about 10% in Germany 
and varied between 15 and 40% in southern EU member states.  Evidence of imperfect 
certification enforcement and fraud is also supported by Anania and Nistico (2003) and 
McCluskey (2000).  
Manning and Baines (2004) stress the importance of certifier accreditation through 
accreditation institutions to assess and ensure independence and objectiveness of 
certification process.  They claim that accredited TPCs offer more guarantees of 
independence, impartiality, competence and sustainable performance to consumers or other 
stakeholders.  However, accreditation is a largely formal process that does not include the 
actual monitoring of the working process.  So far, researchers have a limited understanding 
of the quality and thoroughness of control procedures that may prevent opportunistic 
behaviour but also may create barriers to market entry.  Jahn, Schramm and Spiller (2005) 
criticise that the lack of supervision is the reason behind the introduction of ‘control-of-
control’ mechanisms in many of today’s private agrifood certification systems.  In fact, 
incumbent providers of certification may have strong incentives to prevent market entry of 
new competitors in a rapidly growing certification market and evolving regulations.   
Moreover, TPCs established in one food industry may find it easier to achieve accreditation 
for another industry, than it is for a newcomer in the market.   
Deaton (2004) analyses the role of third-party certifiers using an information economics 
framework.  Along with the assumption of independence of third party certifiers, Deaton 
further assumes certification will only provide effective signalling service if low quality 
producers have higher certification costs than suppliers of high quality products.  Thus 
independence of TPCs is related to the ability and willingness to discriminate between low 
and high quality producers.  Given the competitive pressure that is common to many   654
retailer-led food supply chains, suppliers might view certification of their product as an 
externally imposed regulation in order to protect market shares.  Hence, suppliers may have 
low interests in thorough and costly inspection procedures and third-party certifiers may 
have an incentive to reduce certification costs (Jahn, Schramm and Spiller 2005).   
Following Tanner (2000), Deaton argues that accreditation agencies play a crucial role 
ensuring TPCs remain independent from their clients.  Jahn, Schramm and Spiller (2005) 
also discuss the implications of imperfect certification markets by drawing on the existing 
financial auditing literature and new institutional economics.   
Henson and Reardon (2005) argue that as many food markets are shifting from a price-
based to a quality-based competition third-party certifiers will become an increasingly 
important and powerful player in many high-quality food markets.  This trend may create 
larger and more powerful TPCs over time whose profit-maximizing self interest may affect 
the quality of the certification service.  This justifies a closer scrutiny on both the structure 
of certification markets and their role as signalling credible institutions.  A critical question 
is whether increasing competitive pressure in the certification market will affect the 
outcome and hence the reliability of the certification process?   
3. Analytical  Framework 
The theoretical economic literature investigates the role of market intermediaries, auditors 
and certifiers in different contexts and markets.  In here the aim is to propose a framework 
to analyse how market structure impacts the provision of credible by third party certifiers.  
Jahn, Schramm and Spiller 2005, analyse the reliability of certification focusing on the 
relationship between a standard owner and certifying bodies.  In turn, here the focus is on 
transactions between third party certifiers and firms seeking certification.  More specifically 
the aim is to investigate whether competition between certifiers impacts the quality of 
certification. 
Previous work has analysed the role of intermediaries as agents disclosing otherwise private 
information and at the impact of the market structure on its effectiveness.  Three main 
findings are relevant for our analysis:  First, Tirole (1986) shows that increasing 
competition between third-party certifiers and either buyers or sellers of food products may 
lead to noisy signals and hinder the objectiveness of the certification process.  Second, the 
number of third party certifiers in the market may affect the amount of information revealed 
(Lizzeri 1999).  Third, Deaton (2004) suggests that the role of TPC as signalling institutions 
decreasing information asymmetries critically depends on their objectiveness. 
Other factors affecting performance of third party certifiers found in the literature are the 
institutional setting in which the certification body operates; the effectiveness of monitoring 
by a “control-of-the-control” agent; or the public or private nature of the certification body 
(Jahn, Schramm and Spiller 2005).   
The framework proposed here illustrates the structure of a private, business to business 
certification, such is the EUREPGAP standard or those emerging from the ISO 9000.  With 
the underlying assumption of a private standard owner Figure 1 illustrates the institutional 
structure of a third-party certification system where the owner of the voluntary standard 
establishes accreditation system to guarantee and streamline the flow of certified product up 




Assuming a leading position of the retail sector in the supply chain, the suppliers provide 
certificates to signal standard compliance with the retail standard.  The certificate is issued 
by a certifier based on an establish standard that is laid down and overviewed by the 
standard owner.  Certifiers in turn have to prove their eligibility to conduct inspections 
through ISO 65/EN 45011 standard accreditation.  Finally, the standard owner is   655
responsible for the development and ultimate monitoring of the specific standards and its 
control procedures.  
As the majority of private food safety and quality schemes are based on ISO 9000 
standards, third–party certification providers are offering market based inspection and 
certification services.  Depending on the nature and scope of the standard the costs of 
certification and associated inspection routines might be high (Nadvi and Waeltring 2002).  
Moreover, leading accredited third-party certification bodies, like SGS, DNV (Det Norske 
Veritas) Moody’s and Integra BVBA that provide certification services internationally 
might sub-contract national standard organisation.  While the standard owner aims at the 
highest possible level of compliance, the competitive structure of the certification market 
may affect this goal. In fact, individual certifiers that are sub-contracted to become agents 
of larger certification companies may pursue different stringency levels and certify products 
or processes that otherwise do not meet standard requirements.  Hence, changes in the 
competitive structure of the certification market may have significant implication for both 
certifiers and associated suppliers.   
A credible certification scheme is one where high quality products have higher chances of 
being certified, than low quality products ones (Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone 2003).  If 
a TPC is truly objective, independent and competent it will not only be able to minimize 
both type I and II certification errors but also will resist any pressure to relax its procedures.  
Off course objectivity and competence is costly and these costs will raise the more detailed 
and accurate is the certification process.  Assuming that the level of objectiveness increases 
with firm size and reputation asset, then multinational certifiers may not only have better 
chances of being accredited but also of getting more contracts to provide certification.   
Reputation asset itself is dependent on the level of experience a certifier has in the market.  
Increasing competition may either increase the level of stringency or reduced it.  An 
increased competition may prevent reputed firms from relaxing their level of monitoring, 
especially if the control of the controllers is effective. However, it may also occur that 
higher pressure from other firms competing to provide certification hinders objectivity in 
certification and thus has a negative impact.   
To get accreditation certifiers must demonstrate tits independence and objectivity, but once 
this stage is overcome, these firms have to sell their services of certification and compete 
with other accredited firms for a fixed number of firms seeking certification of products or 
processes.  There may be a difference between the procedures justifying the accreditation 
and their use in practice, such that the reality of the certification process is quite distinct 
from what was intended and announced to obtain accreditation.  The argument tested 
empirically in the next section is that increasing competition will increase the gap between 
the intended level of quality certification and what is actually observed.  Overall two 
seemingly important issues will be analysed.  First, it is necessary to treat the objectivity of 
TPCs in relative, rather than absolute terms.  This is because if TPCs compete in the 
provision of certification services there will be inevitably differences in the level of service 
provided.  Second, given a fast growing market for third-party certification it is worthwhile 
to investigate what factors determine TPCs objectiveness and how they impact the ability to 
provide credible signals to the market.  
4.  Data, Empirical Model and Results  
To illustrate the hypothetical relationship between competition and the objectiveness of 
third-party certifiers a case study is constructed based on the international certification 
market for the EurepGAP standard in the fruit and vegetables industry.  We select the fruit 
and vegetable industry because it is the origin of the EurepGAP standard system.  A 
particularly interesting feature of this pre-farm-gate-standard for good agricultural practices 
is its limitation as a business to business label that cannot be promoted to consumers.  To 
enter the certification market for EurepGAP, third party certification bodies have to be   656
accredited according to the EN 45011 or ISO65 norm.  These norms state that third-party 
certifiers should be independent, impartial, and confidential and have integrity (EurepGAP 
2006). Currently EurepGAP recognizes over 100 control bodies in more then 70 countries.  
These compete to certify producers seeking contracts with retailers.  By analyzing data 
available through the EurepGAP web site it is apparent that large multi-national certifiers 
compete against smaller national certifiers that only operate in single countries.  The system 
allows for sub-contracting of certification services for EurepGAP in the fruit and vegetable 
sector.  This makes a particularly interesting case study for the competitive environment in 
the market for third party certification.   
4.1 Data Set 
The empirical data used in this analysis is partly obtained directly from the EurepGAP web 
site (EurepGAP 2006).  EurepGAP publishes and updates comprehensive information 
relating to the approval of TPCs for EurepGAP’s quality assurance system certification, 
that have applied for accreditation under EN 45011 or ISO65 norms.  This information 
includes a list of currently approved and operating certification bodies in over 100 
countries.  EurepGAP publishes detailed firm information together with dates of firm’s 
application and final approval of EurepGAP accreditation (EurepGAP 2006).  Other 
relevant information on the specifics of fruit and vegetables markets in countries where 
EurepGAP is active was obtained from public statistical sources (FAO 2007).  
4.2 Empirical Model 
A nested panel-model approach is used to analyse the impact of current market structures in 
the market for EurepGAP certified fruits and vegetables on the level of competition in a 
cross-section of over 100 TPCs in 28 countries and in the year 2006.  The number of 
accredited TPCs in the certification market of country i is regressed on the date of 
accreditation of a TPC (2000 - 2007), and the timelag between a TPC’s application and 
accreditation under EurepGAP.  Other explanatory variable are the number of countries for 
which a TPC is approved under EurepGAP, and its individual share in the market for 
certified fruits and vegetables in a country i.  The degree of country i’s export orientation is 
measured as the relation of its total value of agricultural and food exports and the quantities 
of fruits or vegetables produced.  Finally, geographical specifics of TPC markets in 
different world regions are introduced through dummy variables. 
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Comp_Cert is our dependant variable and denotes the number of competitors of TPC j in 
country i and in the particular year 2006.  The error εit is assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean zero.  Table 1 presents definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Time_of_Entry represents the month and year of entry of a TPC into the EurepGAP system.  
Note that there is an increasing number of TPC around the world has applied for 
accreditation under EurepGAP system.  We hypothesize that a later entry into the system 
entails higher competitive pressure as the number of incumbent certifiers increases.  
Activity is a proxy of a TPC’s scale of operation providing information on the number of 
countries in which the company certifies fruits and vegetables for EurepGAP.  As can be 
seen from Table 1 the average TPC certifies produce in around 13 countries.  However, the 
standard deviation indicates a large band with. From the dataset we can identify TPC’s   657
active in only a single country and global players – like SGS – that certify produce for 




  Large-scale TPC’s will thus have a competitive advantage over smaller and more 
“national” certifiers within EurepGAP, due to significant differences mainly in cost 
structures and reputation assets.  Moreover, larger companies that are diversified across 
many markets will be less affected by increased competitive pressure in a single market.  
Hence, we hypothesize a negative impact of Activity on the level of competition.  
Share_Veggie and Share_Fruit describe the TPC i’s share in country j’s market for 
certified vegetable and fruits, respectively.  With increasing market shares of individual 
certifiers in a market we assume lower levels of competition, as the underlying market 
structure deviates toward more oligopolistic structures and a monopoly when a single 
certifier covers the entire quota of certified produce.  
Exp_Agri and Exp_Food are proxies for export orientation of a relevant country with 
respect to its overall exports of agricultural and food products, relative to the size of its fruit 
and vegetable sector.  We assume that an increasing involvement in international fruit and 
vegetable trade positively affects a countries importance within the global EurepGAP 
system.  Hence, we hypothesize positive signs for these variables.  The variable SGS equals 
one for countries in which this global player in the market for third-party certification is 
present and is zero in all other countries.  TPC’s like SGS are global market leaders in 
certification and quality assurance for foods.  Markets in which these players are present 
will attract market entry of smaller TPC’s and therefore increase the level of inter-TPC 
competition. 
Americas and Europe are geographical dummy variables.  Our data set identifies South 
America and Europe – the origin of EurepGAP – as areas of major activity.  Hence, we 
hypothesize that these two geographical regions show greater levels of competition among 
producer contracts and amounts of produce to be certified.  
Table 2 presents the panel model estimates.  Among several model specifications Exact-
Maximum Likelihood Estimators (ExactML) corrected for first-order serial autocorrelation 
revealed the best results based on the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC).   
Statistically insignificant F-tests could not reject the null hypothesis of equivalence of 
ExactML and fixed-effects models at the 95-percent level.  The estimates of the nested 
panel model are generally well behaved. 
 
[Table 2] 
4.3 Empirical Results 
Our results reveal a relative competitive advantage of larger and more diversified TPC’s.  
As indicated by the variables Activity and Share_Fruit increasing diversification of activity, 
in terms of the number of markets a TPC certifies product and an increasing market share 
result in lower levels of competitive pressure from competitors.  This result is significant 
with regard to the market for EurepGAP certified fruit.  The variable Share_Veggie also 
shows the expected negative sign but is insignificant.  
The variable Year_of_Entry provides valuable insight on the relation between market entry 
and the level of competition.  The EurepGAP certification and quality assurance system has 
gained increasing recognition and importance in international food trade since its 
inauguration in 1997.  The positive sign indicates that over time, increased entry due to 
rising numbers of accredited TPC’s has significantly increased the level of competition 
among certification bodies and across countries.     658
The internationalization of trade in foods and agricultural products in recent years has been 
a driving factor of increased importance of international standardization and certification 
systems as is EurepGAP.  Increasing uncertainty about product characteristics such as 
product quality and food safety levels are inherent attributes of today’s global food trade.  
For many countries, in particular developing countries that supply fruit and vegetables to 
European and North American high-value markets, reliable certification of produce are 
vital.  Our model results reveal that rising levels of export orientation in food production, 
relative to the country’s size of vegetable and fruit production have a positive impact on the 
number of competing TPC’s.  Interestingly, the exact opposite result is obtained with 
respect to a countries export orientation in agricultural trade.  Increasing levels of 
agricultural or commodity exports have a significant negative effect on the penetration of 
this market by TPC’s for EurepGAP.  
Another variable that provides important insight into the specifics of the EurepGAP system 
is captured in the variable SGS.  As hypothesized earlier we assume a significant effect of 
reputation assets and economies of scale on the competitiveness of certification bodies 
within the global EurepGAP system.  The dummy variable shows that the presence SGS as 
one of the market leaders accredited under EurepGAP has a positive effect on certifier 
competition.  Unfortunately, the variable is insignificant.  
Finally, the model shows results on the impact of geographical market location on 
competition.  Our data set reveals that EurepGAP plays a major role the fruit and vegetable 
sectors of many South American countries.  Another focus of EurepGAP, of course, is 
within Europe.  Against the hypothesized impact, both variables show negative sign.  For 
TPC’s operating from South American countries we observe a significant and negative 
impact on the level of competition among quantities of fruits and vegetables produced 
under EurepGAP.  The same effect can be seen for Europe, but remains insignificant.  
5. Concluding  remarks 
Third-party certifiers are playing an increasing role in international quality food markets, as 
consumers increasingly demand clear and credible signals when they purchase high quality 
and safe food.  Global food procurement and trade entail increasing uncertainty and 
information asymmetries.  Competition in food markets is shifting from a firm and price 
based to a supply chain and credence attributes based configuration, where private third-
party certifiers emerge as important signalling institution.   
Previous research has addressed the importance of third-party certifiers in food market as a 
credible signalling institution that facilitates the reduction of uncertainties related to 
information asymmetries in credence food quality and safety attributes.  The main argument 
is that to properly fulfil their role TPCs must be independent and objective (Tanner 2000, 
Deaton 2004, and Busch et al 2005).  This paper maintains that the objectiveness of private 
third-party certifiers may be affected by the competitive structure of the certification 
market.  Namely, with an increasing number of certifiers in a market, objectiveness may be 
hindered.   
Based on panel data of the EurepGAP standard in the international fruits and vegetables 
market our empirical analysis provides first empirical evidence and valuable insight into the 
competitive structures within the international EurepGAP standard and certification system.  
Moreover, the results are intended to stimulate the ongoing discussion on the role of third-
party certification in food product as important means to assure quality and safety of 
consumer foods.  
However, the study and in particular our empirical analysis also reveals the need for more 
detailed market data to investigate the differences between market segments of certified 
produce and residual commodity market qualities.  Such information is vital to the analysis 
and better understanding of the implications international food standard system such as 
EurepGAP and others have on the performance of many food market.   659
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Tables 
Table 1:  Definitions of Variables and Sample Statistics Table  




Comp_Cert   8.58  5.87 
Explanatory Variables 
Time_of_Entry 
Month and year of EurepGAP accreditation  8.27  4.67 
Timelag 








TPC j’s share in the market for certified 
vegetables in country i (tons) 
821.15 3230.50 
Share_Fruits 
TPC j’s share in the market for certified fruits 
in country i (tons) 
0.24   0.27 
Exp_Agri 
Country i’s value of agricultural exports per ton 
of vegetable and fruit produced in 2006 
15694 16960.18 
Exp_Food 
Country i’s value of food exports per ton of 
vegetable and fruit produced in 2006 
13645 14559.73 
SGS  Presence of global TPC player SGS in country i  0.73  0.44 
Americas 
Geographical dummy variable North and South 
American countries  
0.13 0.33 
Europe 
Geographical dummy variable European 
countries  
0.72 0.44   662





Year of Entry  0.006*** 
(0.00) 
8.43 
Activity   -0.208*** 
(0.03) 
-5.99 
Market Share Vegetables  0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.97 
Market Share Fruit  -0.003*** 
(0.00) 
-2.86 
Export Orientation Agricultural Products  -0.093*** 
(0.03) 
-3.60 
Export Orientation Foods  0.094*** 
(0.02) 
3.62 
Presence of SGS  0.724 
(1.03) 
0.70 
South America  -4.057*** 
(1.54) 
-2.62 









a Dependent variable: Number of competing TPC’s in country i.  
b ExactML random effect estimates of elasticities corrected for serial correlation. t-statistics 




* statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively.  663
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